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Inglaterra y GalesExtension of timeJurisdiction article

Notice and time bars in England and Wales

In English law a notice clause bars a claim only if, on its true construction, it makes the relief conditional on the notice. Disclosure and Barring Service v Tata Consultancy Services Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 380 sets out five factors for reading the clause. It holds that neither the label "condition precedent" nor a fixed number of days is required. On the printed forms, NEC4 cl 61.3 is a hard bar at 8 weeks, with one exception. The JCT 2024 delay notice is probably not a condition precedent (Storia's inference: no judgment has construed it), but the JCT loss and expense notice can be.

Reviewed 13 oct 202613 min read9 sources

Disponible solo en inglés Este artículo aún no se ha traducido. Los plazos, el derecho a reclamar y el procedimiento descritos aquí rozan lo jurídico, y una traducción automática sería un riesgo de credibilidad más que una comodidad: por eso se sirve el original inglés íntegro hasta que exista una traducción revisada.

At a glance

Inglaterra y Gales
Last reviewed
13 October 2026
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Scope
When a notice provision is a condition precedent, and how the English forms answer it
Principal forms
JCT Design and Build 2024, JCT SBC 2016 and 2024, NEC4 ECC, FIDIC 1999
Evidence basis
Judgments read on Find Case Law and Scottish Courts (Bremer and Gaymark paraphrased); form clause numbers and headings only
§ 00

Key facts

  1. 01

    The test

    Is the relief made conditional on the notice? DBS v TCS [2025] EWCA Civ 380 ¶26(a) to (e) is the framework, and it applies to any notice clause, not only to delay notices.

  2. 02

    What DBS did not decide

    What happens if the notice step is taken, but late. Coulson LJ held that a clear requirement to act "promptly" can be a condition precedent (¶¶50 to 51). No Non-conformance Report was ever served, so the effect of late service was left open (Lewison LJ, ¶82).

  3. 03

    No magic words

    "Provided that" plus a clear time requirement can be enough, with no stated consequence (Steria v Sigma [2007] EWHC 3454 (TCC) ¶¶90 to 91). Genuine ambiguity is read against a condition precedent (¶89).

  4. 04

    JCT 2024, time

    Notice "forthwith" once delay is "reasonably apparent" (DB cl 2.24). Not a condition precedent on the printed wording, and no deemed grant if the Employer misses its 8 weeks. This is Storia's inference: no judgment has construed the 2024 wording.

  5. 05

    JCT, money

    Where the entitlement is "subject to" the notification clause, the loss and expense notice is a condition precedent (FES v HFD [2024] CSIH 37, Scottish and persuasive). The result can be time but no money.

  6. 06

    NEC4 ECC

    Cl 61.3: notify within 8 weeks of becoming aware, or the Prices, the Completion Date and the Key Dates do not change. The bar does not apply to events arising from the Project Manager or Supervisor giving an instruction or notification, issuing a certificate or changing an earlier decision. Deemed acceptance under cl 61.4 and cl 62.6 requires a second notice from the Contractor.

  7. 07

    The escape that fails

    A missed condition-precedent notice that could have been given does not set time at large (Multiplex v Honeywell ¶105). Jackson J had "considerable doubt that Gaymark represents the law of England" (¶103).

In England and Wales a missed notice defeats a claim only if the contract makes the relief conditional on it. Whether it does is a question of construction, and the Court of Appeal's five factors in DBS v TCS (2025) are now the way to answer it. On the printed forms the results are different. NEC4 cl 61.3 is a hard bar at 8 weeks, with one exception. On the printed wording, the JCT 2024 delay notice is not a condition precedent (Inference.), although the JCT loss and expense notice can be. An amended contract can change all of this, so always read the executed contract and its amendments.

The general concept of a condition-precedent notice, compared across the main forms, is on the neutral notice and time bars page. The letters themselves are on the England and Wales delay notice templates page. For orientation across the whole jurisdiction, start at the England and Wales extension of time hub.

§ 01

A notice clause bars the claim only if it makes the relief conditional

The leading statement is Disclosure and Barring Service v Tata Consultancy Services Ltd1 [2025] EWCA Civ 380. DBS claimed about £1.592m in Delay Payments under cl 6.2.3. The contract required it first to issue a Non-conformance Report, and it never did. The Court of Appeal held that the procedure was a condition precedent to Delay Payments, so DBS recovered nothing on that head. Note which party lost: the doctrine bound the customer, not the supplier. A condition-precedent argument is not reserved for employers.

Coulson LJ's five factors at ¶26 are:

  1. (a) Whether a party must comply with a requirement before it is entitled to relief depends on the precise words used, read in their contractual context.
  2. (b) To be a condition precedent, the clause needs something that makes the relief conditional on the requirement.
  3. (c) Clear words are usually needed, but the clause does not have to call itself a "condition precedent".
  4. (d) The link between the requirement and the relief will usually have to be expressed as an obligation ("shall"). That is usually necessary but not sufficient.
  5. (e) The requirement does not need a precise time limit in days or weeks. The court's examples are a requirement to act in a "timely" way or "within a reasonable time".

Two limits on that list matter in practice. First, a clear requirement to act "promptly" can be a condition precedent, but the effect of lateness is open. The clause required DBS to provide the report promptly. Coulson LJ held that "A clear requirement to provide the NCR promptly was sufficient for the requirement to be a condition precedent" (¶50), and that "There is no difference between 'timely' and 'promptly' for these purposes" (¶51). Lewison LJ, concurring, agreed that "the absence of a fixed time limit is not incompatible with a requirement being a condition of the contract" (¶82). What remains open is a step taken, but late: DBS served no report at all, so Lewison LJ said that point did not need deciding (¶82). Second, the factors are a framework for reading any notice clause, not a checklist that a clause passes or fails. A clause using "shall" is not a condition precedent if nothing makes the relief depend on the notice, and a clause with no deadline can still bar the claim if the conditionality is plain.

The older starting point is Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA2 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 109 (HL), which DBS calls "the leading case" (¶13); factor (b) builds on Lord Wilberforce's speech in it. Bremer is also cited for a stricter formulation: a precise time plus express words of forfeiture. That remains the safest drafting, but Steria (2007) and DBS ¶26(c) and (e) show it is not the minimum for a time bar to bite.

§ 02

No magic words are needed, but the notice must come from the claimant

Steria Ltd v Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd3 [2007] EWHC 3454 (TCC) is the case factor (e) builds on. The sub-contract made the extension "provided that" written notice had been given within a reasonable period. HHJ Stephen Davies held that this was a condition precedent although it stated no consequence for non-compliance (¶¶90 to 91). He also held that genuine ambiguity about whether a notice is a condition precedent should be resolved against that reading, because such a provision benefits only the employer (¶89). That is a principle of construction specific to this kind of clause, not contra proferentem against the drafter.

The same judgment decides who must give the notice. It "must emanate from Steria" (¶82). A minute of a meeting prepared by the other side's representative "would not … by itself" be a valid notice. The words "by itself" matter: minutes are not irrelevant, but the other party's record of a discussion is not the claimant's notice.

Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No 2)4 [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC) adds two points. On the clause before him, Jackson J read the notice obligation as a duty to "do his best as soon as he reasonably can" (¶82), with the supporting particulars to be included in the notice "if practicable" and otherwise as soon as possible (¶¶79, 81). He also answered the complaint that time bars are unfair: notice provisions "serve a valuable purpose" (¶103). They let the employer investigate while the facts are current and withdraw an instruction once its cost becomes apparent.

§ 03

On the printed JCT 2024 wording, time has no time bar, but the money notice can forfeit

Under JCT Design and Build 20245, cl 2.24 (Notice by Contractor of delay to progress) requires the Contractor to give notice "forthwith" once delay to progress becomes "reasonably apparent". The Employer may ask for further information within 14 days (cl 2.24.4, new in 2024). Under cl 2.25 it must then notify its decision, fixing a later Completion Date if that is "fair and reasonable", within 8 weeks under cl 2.25.2 (12 weeks in 2016). If the Employer misses that period, there is no deemed grant. The 12-week review after practical completion is unchanged.

On the printed wording, the delay notice is not a condition precedent. (Inference.) The clause uses "shall", which DBS ¶26(d) says is not sufficient on its own. Nothing in cl 2.24 or cl 2.25 makes fixing a new Completion Date depend on the notice having been served on time. The post-completion review also lets the Employer fix a later date on its own review. No reported English judgment has construed the JCT 2024 extension of time provisions, so this is Storia's reading, not a holding. That does not make a late notice harmless. In fixing a fair and reasonable date, the assessor can be expected to take into account delay that a timely notice would have avoided or reduced. (Opinion.)

The money side is different. In FES Ltd v HFD Construction Group Ltd6 [2024] CSIH 37, the Inner House considered JCT SBC/Q/Scot 2016, with some bespoke amendments (¶[2]). Under cl 4.20.1, reimbursement was "subject to … compliance with the provisions of clause 4.21". The court held that the cl 4.21 notice was a condition precedent to loss and expense. It also held that notice "within a limited (but not certain) time span is a reasonable condition" (¶[26]). Three cautions apply:

  • It is Scottish. It is persuasive in England and Wales, not binding. Even so, its reasoning is consistent with the points later set out in DBS ¶26(b) and (e), on wording English JCT users will recognise. (Inference.)
  • It was decided on the Scottish SBC 2016, with a "subject to" link. In DB 2024 the Relevant Matters sit at cl 4.21, and the same result there is Storia's reading, not a holding. (Inference.) Find the "subject to" link in your own form before relying on FES.
  • It says nothing about the delay notice. It is not authority that the JCT delay notice is, or is not, a condition precedent.

So a contractor can obtain the extension and lose the loss and expense on the same facts, for a purely procedural reason. The 2024 edition adds a further trap. Epidemic (cl 4.21.6) and change in law or guidance (cl 4.21.7) are Relevant Matters only if selected in the Contract Particulars, although the corresponding Relevant Events (cl 2.26.7 and 2.26.8) apply without any selection. On the Standard Building Contract, the 2016 delay clauses are numbered 2.27, 2.28 and 2.29. Check the SBC 2024 numbers against the form before citing them.

§ 04

NEC4 clause 61.3 is a hard bar, with one exception and a two-step safety valve

NEC4 has no extension of time clause. Time relief is a change to the Completion Date, made through the compensation event machinery. Under NEC4 ECC7 cl 61.3, the Contractor must notify a compensation event within 8 weeks of becoming aware of it. If it does not, the Prices, the Completion Date and the Key Dates are not changed. Unlike the JCT delay clause, cl 61.3 states its own consequence. That is the "something" DBS ¶26(b) requires, and it is why cl 61.3 operates as a time bar.

The NEC4 exception turns on the kind of event, not on what the Project Manager should have done. In NEC4 the bar does not apply to an event that arises from the Project Manager or Supervisor giving an instruction or notification, issuing a certificate, or changing an earlier decision. The wording about an event the Project Manager should have notified but did not is NEC3's; do not carry it into NEC4.

Deemed acceptance does not happen on its own. Under cl 61.4 the Project Manager replies to a notification within 1 week. If it does not, the Contractor may notify that failure. Only if the failure continues for a further 2 weeks is it treated as acceptance that the event is a compensation event. Cl 62.6 works the same way for quotations, which are due within 3 weeks with a 2-week reply period under cl 62.3. A contractor that waits for silence to turn into acceptance, without serving the second notice, gets nothing from either clause.

8weeksNEC4 cl 61.3: notify a compensation event from awareness, or no change to the Prices, Completion Date or Key Dates (exception above)
1 + 2weeksNEC4 cl 61.4: Project Manager's reply period, then the further period after the Contractor notifies the failure
8weeksJCT DB 2024 cl 2.25.2: Employer's decision on a new Completion Date, with no deemed grant if it is missed
§ 05

The two English forms, side by side

JCT DB 2024NEC4 ECC
TriggerDelay to progress becomes "reasonably apparent" (cl 2.24)The Contractor becomes aware of the event (cl 61.3)
Deadline"Forthwith". No fixed period8 weeks
Condition precedent?Delay notice: no, on the printed wording (Inference.). Loss and expense notice: yes where the entitlement is "subject to" it (FES, persuasive; Inference. for DB 2024)Yes. The clause states that the Prices, Completion Date and Key Dates are not changed
ExceptionNone needed for time. Late notice can still affect what is fair and reasonable (Opinion.)Events arising from a Project Manager or Supervisor instruction or notification, a certificate, or a changed earlier decision
Deemed acceptanceNone. No deemed grant if the 8-week decision period is missedTwo-step: cl 61.4 (1 week, then notice of failure plus 2 weeks) and cl 62.6 (notice of failure plus 2 weeks)
If the employer side fails to actNo automatic consequence. The argument that the machinery has broken down rarely succeeds (Opinion.)The Contractor's notice of failure brings in deemed acceptance

Printed forms only. Bespoke amendment is common (Opinion.), and the executed contract governs.

§ 06

FIDIC 1999 in an English court: a condition precedent with a generous trigger

In Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v HM Attorney General for Gibraltar8 [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC), Akenhead J treated FIDIC 1999 Sub-Clause 20.1 as a condition precedent, which the contractor accepted (¶311). He also construed it reasonably broadly (¶312). The 28 days can run from when it is clear there will be delay (prospectively) or from when delay has actually started (retrospectively). That holding is Akenhead J's alone. The Court of Appeal, [2015] EWCA Civ 712, dismissed the appeal; no ground concerned Sub-Clause 20.1, which the judgment mentions only in quoting cl 4.12 (¶21).

§ 07

A missed condition-precedent notice does not set time at large

The standard rescue argument runs like this: the employer caused the delay, the contractor's notice was late so no extension is available, therefore the employer has prevented completion and time is at large. That argument comes from Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd9 [1999] NTSC 143. It does not work in England. In Multiplex v Honeywell (No 2), Jackson J saw "considerable force in Professor Wallace' criticisms of Gaymark" and had "considerable doubt that Gaymark represents the law of England" (¶103). He did not need to decide the point finally (¶104), but concluded that where compliance with the notice clause was possible and the sub-contractor simply failed to comply, time was not set at large (¶105). A contractor that misses a condition-precedent notice should assume the claim is lost, not that time is at large. The wider prevention analysis is on the prevention principle and time at large page, and the Australian position on Gaymark is on the Australia notice and time bars page.

§ 08

Amendments turn notices into conditions precedent

Amended JCT contracts commonly convert cl 2.24 into a condition precedent, usually by adding a fixed period and words stating that the Contractor loses its entitlement if it does not comply. (Opinion.) As Steria held and DBS ¶26(e) confirms, a fixed period is not needed: a requirement to notify "within a reasonable time" will bar the claim if the relief is clearly made conditional on it. Anyone who analyses a notice question from the printed form, without the schedule of amendments, is analysing the wrong contract.

Notice and adjudication interact closely, because an adjudicator decides on the record the parties produce. The adjudicating extensions of time page explains how a time-bar defence has to be raised there. For comparison, the Canadian position is stricter: see Canada notice and time bars and Ontario notice and time bars.

§ 09

Where Storia fits

Every notice question on this page turns on dates your own records must prove: when delay became reasonably apparent, when the Contractor became aware of a compensation event, and who sent what to whom. Storia turns drawings, RFIs, programmes, correspondence and site records into one source-linked project record, built as the work happens. The awareness date in a cl 61.3 argument, or the date a notice was served under cl 2.24, can then be traced back to the document it came from rather than reconstructed after the window has closed.

Notes

Sources and authorities

9 cited
  1. 1
    Disclosure and Barring Service v Tata Consultancy Services Ltd[2025] EWCA Civ 380, Court of Appeal (Lewison, Coulson and Snowden LJJ), 4 April 2025, on appeal from Constable J [2024] EWHC 1185 (TCC)

    The Non-conformance Report procedure was a condition precedent to DBS's entitlement to Delay Payments under cl 6.2.3 (about £1.592m claimed). DBS never served one and recovered nothing. ¶26 sets out five factors: (a) the precise words and their context; (b) something must make the relief conditional; (c) clear language is normally needed, but not the label "condition precedent"; (d) "shall" is usually necessary but not sufficient; (e) a precise time limit is not essential, the examples being "timely" and "within a reasonable time".

    Find Case Law

  2. 2
    Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA[1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 109, House of Lords

    The House of Lords decision that <em>DBS v TCS</em> calls "the leading case" on conditions precedent (¶13). <em>DBS</em> ¶26(b) builds on Lord Wilberforce's speech for the need for something that makes the relief conditional. <em>Bremer</em> is also often cited for a stricter formulation requiring a precise time and express words of forfeiture.

  3. 3
    Steria Ltd v Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd[2007] EWHC 3454 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (HHJ Stephen Davies), 15 November 2007

    A "provided that" clause with a clear time requirement is a condition precedent even without a stated consequence (¶¶90 to 91). Genuine ambiguity is resolved against a condition-precedent reading because the provision benefits only the employer (¶89). The notice "must emanate from Steria": a minute prepared by the other side's representative "would not … by itself" be valid notice (¶82).

    Find Case Law

  4. 4
    Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No 2)[2007] EWHC 447 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Jackson J), 6 March 2007

    On the notice obligation before the court, the sub-contractor had to "do his best as soon as he reasonably can" (¶82), with the supporting particulars to be included in the notice "if practicable" and otherwise as soon as possible (¶¶79, 81). Notice provisions "serve a valuable purpose" (¶103). Jackson J saw "considerable force in Professor Wallace' criticisms of Gaymark" and had "considerable doubt that Gaymark represents the law of England" (¶103). He did not need to decide the point finally and distinguished Gaymark (¶104), concluding that where compliance was possible but the sub-contractor simply failed to comply, time was not set at large (¶105).

    Find Case Law

  5. 5
    JCT Design and Build Contract 2024JCT DB 2024, cl 2.24, 2.24.4, 2.25, 2.25.2, 2.26, 4.21, 4.21.6, 4.21.7 · current as at 13 October 2026

    Cl 2.24 (Notice by Contractor of delay to progress): notice "forthwith" once delay is "reasonably apparent". Cl 2.24.4 (new): the Employer may ask for further information within 14 days. Cl 2.25 (Fixing Completion Date): decision within 8 weeks under cl 2.25.2, down from 12. Cl 4.21 lists the Relevant Matters. Epidemic (4.21.6) and change in law or guidance (4.21.7) are Relevant Matters only if selected in the Contract Particulars.

  6. 6
    FES Ltd v HFD Construction Group Ltd[2024] CSIH 37, Inner House, Court of Session (Lord Carloway, Lady Wise, Lord Beckett), 25 October 2024

    On JCT SBC/Q/Scot 2016, cl 4.20.1 made reimbursement "subject to … compliance with the provisions of clause 4.21", so the cl 4.21 notice was a condition precedent to loss and expense. Notice "within a limited (but not certain) time span is a reasonable condition" (¶[26]).

    Buscar en Find Case Law

  7. 7
    NEC4 Engineering and Construction ContractNEC4 ECC (June 2017, with amendments in January 2019, October 2020 and January 2023), cl 60.1, 61.3, 61.4, 62.3, 62.6

    Cl 61.3: the Contractor notifies a compensation event within 8 weeks of becoming aware of it, failing which the Prices, the Completion Date and the Key Dates are not changed. The bar does not apply to an event arising from the Project Manager or Supervisor giving an instruction or notification, issuing a certificate or changing an earlier decision. Cl 61.4 and cl 62.6 provide deemed acceptance only after the Contractor notifies the Project Manager's failure and a further 2 weeks pass.

  8. 8
    Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v HM Attorney General for Gibraltar[2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Akenhead J), 16 April 2014

    FIDIC 1999 Sub-Clause 20.1 is a condition precedent, which OHL accepted (¶311). It is construed reasonably broadly: notice is due when it is clear there will be delay (prospectively) or when delay has started (retrospectively) (¶312).

    Find Case Law

  9. 9
    Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd[1999] NTSC 143, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (Australia)

    Background only. The Australian decision behind the argument that an employer-caused delay sets time at large where the contractor has failed to give a condition-precedent notice. English courts have not followed it: Jackson J doubted it represents English law and concluded that a failure to give a notice that could have been given does not set time at large (Multiplex v Honeywell (No 2) ¶¶103 to 105).

    Buscar en AustLII

General information, not legal advice. Reviewed 13 oct 2026. Spotted an error? info@storiatechnologies.com

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