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Inglaterra y GalesExtension of timeJurisdiction article

Prevention principle and time at large in England and Wales

In England and Wales the prevention principle is a default rule of risk allocation that clear words displace, not an overriding rule of law. An employer act that in fact delays completion sets time at large only where the contract gives no way to extend for it. Modern JCT and NEC4 forms largely close that gap, so time at large is rarely won, and when it is won it can cost the contractor its liquidated damages cap.

Reviewed 13 oct 202613 min read17 sources
Same topic inCAAUE&W

Disponible solo en inglés Este artículo aún no se ha traducido. Los plazos, el derecho a reclamar y el procedimiento descritos aquí rozan lo jurídico, y una traducción automática sería un riesgo de credibilidad más que una comodidad: por eso se sirve el original inglés íntegro hasta que exista una traducción revisada.

At a glance

Inglaterra y Gales
Last reviewed
13 October 2026
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Scope
The prevention principle, time at large and their consequences. Concurrency and notice bars are on sibling pages
Principal forms
JCT Design and Build 2024 (and 2016 on legacy projects); NEC4 ECC (June 2017, with amendments in January 2019, October 2020 and January 2023)
Evidence basis
Modern judgments checked against their text on Find Case Law on 13 October 2026. Classical cases stated in paraphrase
§ 00

Key facts

  1. 01

    The short answer

    An employer that prevents completion by the contract date cannot hold the contractor to that date unless the contract lets the date move for the act of prevention. Where it does, the date moves and liquidated damages run from the new date.

  2. 02

    Status of the rule

    A default allocation, displaceable by express terms. The Court of Appeal in North Midland v Cyden (2018) held that it is not "an overriding rule of public or legal policy" (¶30).

  3. 03

    The working test

    Multiplex v Honeywell (No 2) (2007) ¶56: legitimate employer acts can be prevention if they delay completion; prevention does not set time at large where the contract extends time for it; an ambiguous EOT clause is read in the contractor's favour.

  4. 04

    The causation limit

    "Prevention in fact; not prevention on some notional or hypothetical basis" (Adyard, ¶264). An employer act that would have delayed an unimpeded contractor is not enough: it must actually delay completion, which it may not do where the contractor is already late for its own reasons.

  5. 05

    Why it rarely succeeds

    JCT's "impediment, prevention or default" Relevant Event (cl 2.26) and NEC4 cl 60.1(18) (Client breach not otherwise listed) catch most employer acts the listed events miss. A contractor that fails to use the machinery does not get time at large instead (Multiplex ¶¶103 to 104, doubting Gaymark).

  6. 06

    Where it still bites

    Requirements imposed outside the contract's machinery, and conduct that sets the date aside. Both 2026 examples (UK Global Healthcare; Durkan v Wallace) are interlocutory: arguable, not yet tried.

  7. 07

    The double edge

    If time is at large, liquidated damages fall away and the employer sues for general damages. Where the liquidated damages rate was the limit of delay liability, the contractor may face a larger, uncapped claim. Model the downside before pleading it.

In England and Wales an employer that prevents the contractor from finishing on time cannot hold it to the contract date, but only if the contract gives no way to move that date for the act in question. The Court of Appeal has settled that the prevention principle is a default allocation of risk, not a rule of public policy, so the parties can draft around it. Modern JCT and NEC4 forms do, which is why time at large is argued often and won rarely. Where it is won, the employer loses its liquidated damages but not its claim, and the contractor may lose the cap those damages gave it.

For the general doctrine see the neutral extension of time page; for the English framework, the England and Wales hub.

§ 01

The principle is a default allocation, and clear words displace it

The status question is settled. In North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd1 [2018] EWCA Civ 1744 the Court of Appeal (Sir Terence Etherton MR, Sir Ernest Ryder SPT and Coulson LJ, who gave the lead judgment) upheld a bespoke amendment to JCT Design and Build 2005. Clause 2.25.1.3(b) provided that "any delay caused by a Relevant Event which is concurrent with another delay for which the Contractor is responsible shall not be taken into account". Coulson LJ held that the principle is not "an overriding rule of public or legal policy" (¶30), and that a term implied to stop the employer levying liquidated damages for the concurrent period would contradict the express terms (¶45).

So the principle governs only where the parties have said nothing. The live question is one of construction: what does this contract, as amended, say about this event?

§ 02

Multiplex gives the working test, and the qualifier in the first limb matters

The modern statement is Jackson J's in Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No 2)2 [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC) at ¶56:

  1. "Actions by the employer which are perfectly legitimate under a construction contract may still be characterised as prevention, if those actions cause delay beyond the contractual completion date" (¶56(i)).
  2. Acts of prevention by an employer do not set time at large if the contract provides for extension of time in respect of those events (¶56(ii)).
  3. "In so far as the extension of time clause is ambiguous, it should be construed in favour of the contractor" (¶56(iii)).

The first proposition is often quoted without its last clause, and the clause does real work: a legitimate variation instruction is prevention only if it pushes completion beyond the contract date. The second is why the doctrine so rarely succeeds: where the contract extends time for the employer's acts, they move the date instead of destroying it. The third is why employers draft extension clauses widely, though Jackson J added that it "must be treated with care": the lean is towards a construction that lets the contractor recover appropriate extensions of time (¶57), not towards time at large.

§ 03

The classical cases explain the gap that modern forms close

The older authorities, in paraphrase, are background to Multiplex, not the test.

CaseWhat it establishedStatus now
Holme v Guppy3 (1838) 3 M&W 387An owner whose own conduct delayed the builder could not recover the sum stipulated for late completionThe origin of the principle
Dodd v Churton4 [1897] 1 QB 562 (CA)Ordering extra work that delays completion, with no power to extend for it, loses the original dateAnswered by variation Relevant Events and compensation events
Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney Foundations Ltd5 (1970) 1 BLR 111 (CA)Employer delay outside the extension clause destroys the completion date and the liquidated damages clause; the clause must cover the act relied onThe gap the sweep-up events are drafted to close
Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board6 [1973] 1 WLR 601 (HL)A party whose conduct makes timely performance impossible or impracticable cannot insist on the timeRestated in UK Global Healthcare (2026) at ¶32
Rapid Building Group Ltd v Ealing Family Housing Association7 (1984) 29 BLR 5 (CA)Failure to give possession, not covered by the extension provisions, left the employer to general damagesThe consequence, still good law
§ 04

Prevention must be prevention in fact

Causation. In Adyard Abu Dhabi v SD Marine Services8 [2011] EWHC 848 (Comm) Hamblen J required "prevention in fact; not prevention on some notional or hypothetical basis" (¶264). An employer act that would have delayed an unimpeded contractor does not engage the principle if, because the contractor was already late for its own reasons, it made no actual difference to completion. Employers argue further that a contractor already in critical delay cannot be prevented at all; North Midland left that unresolved (¶¶17 to 18), so it is an argument, not settled law (see concurrent delay). So a contractor running prevention needs the same delay evidence as one claiming an extension.

Scope. BNP Paribas Depositary Services Ltd v Briggs & Forrester Engineering Services Ltd9 [2024] EWHC 2903 (TCC) is the most useful recent statement of what prevention is. HHJ Stephen Davies held that an act of prevention may be a breach of an express or implied obligation or the exercise of an entitlement, such as giving an instruction (¶192). What it is not is the occurrence of an event whose risk the contract has already allocated. At ¶193 he adopted Adyard: the conduct must make timely performance "impossible or impracticable" and must actually prevent the contractor carrying out the works. On the facts, the contractor's suspension and termination failed, because the asbestos survey and structural supports it said the Employer had failed to provide (¶207) were within its own design and build risk.

Two cautions. BNP Paribas is sometimes cited as limiting prevention to breaches of contract; ¶192 says otherwise. And the case decided a suspension right under cl 8.9.2 of an amended JCT Design and Build 2016. It construes "prevention" in the JCT phrase "impediment, prevention or default", which is also the cl 2.26 wording relied on below, by reference to the common-law cases (¶193). It is not a time-at-large decision.

§ 05

Why time at large is rarely won under JCT and NEC4

The contractor must show an act of prevention, which in fact delayed completion, which the contract does not deal with. The standard forms are built to defeat the third hurdle.

JCT Design and Build 2024NEC4 ECC
The sweep-up eventJCT Design and Build 202410 lists employer "impediment, prevention or default" among the Relevant Events in cl 2.26NEC4 ECC11 cl 60.1(18): a Client breach not otherwise listed, one of 21 compensation events
What the contractor getsA later Completion Date fixed under cl 2.25A change to the Completion Date through the compensation event assessment (cl 63.5), not an "extension of time" as such
Contractor's noticeCl 2.24, "forthwith" once delay is "reasonably apparent"; not a condition precedent on the printed wording (Inference.)Cl 61.3: notify within 8 weeks of awareness, or the Completion Date does not change (except for events arising from a Project Manager or Supervisor instruction, notification, certificate or changed decision)
If the decision-maker is silentDecision within 8 weeks (cl 2.25.2), but no deemed grantTwo-step deemed acceptance: cl 61.4 and cl 62.6, each after the Contractor notifies the failure
Correcting a wrong answerPost-practical-completion review within 12 weeks; adjudicationAdjudication

Three points close the remaining routes.

The sweep-up event answers Peak. Where the form extends time for employer impediment, prevention or default, or treats Client breach as a compensation event, little is left outside the machinery and Multiplex ¶56(ii) applies. Under NEC4 a lawful Client act that is not a breach must still fit another listed event (Inference.). Ambiguity in the sweep-up helps the contractor argue scope (¶56(iii)), not time at large.

A contractor cannot use its own failure to notify. In Multiplex Jackson J saw "considerable force in Professor Wallace' criticisms of Gaymark" and had "considerable doubt that Gaymark represents the law of England" (¶103). He distinguished Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd12 [1999] NTSC 143 at ¶104 without finally deciding whether it represents English law. The working position in England is that a contractor who misses a condition-precedent notice is time-barred, not released from the date (see notice and time bars). Under NEC4 that means cl 61.3 is not side-stepped by calling a late-notified Client breach prevention (Inference.). For how Australian courts have treated Gaymark since, see prevention and time at large in Australia.

Errors in operating the clause are not failure of the clause. A late, low or nil JCT award (there is no deemed grant) is a dispute about the award, which the post-completion review and adjudication exist to correct. In Mace Construct Ltd v Baltic Investment Holdings Ltd13 [2026] EWHC 976 (TCC) the court confirmed that an adjudicator "can open up, revise and review" the extension granted and carries out "a prospective assessment" under the clause (¶50). A machinery that can be corrected has not broken down, so a tribunal is unlikely to treat a missed 8-week deadline as setting time at large (Opinion.). The route is set out on adjudicating extensions of time.

8 weeksJCT DB 2024 decision period under cl 2.25.2, with no deemed grant if missed
21NEC4 ECC compensation events in cl 60.1, including Client breach at 60.1(18)
£15.35mDHSC's counterclaim in UK Global Healthcare (a gloves supply contract): summary judgment refused; time at large arguable (¶87)
§ 06

Contracts can move the risk further, and Mace shows the drafting

Amended contracts routinely move delay risks the printed forms leave with the Employer (Opinion.). In Mace the contract was an amended JCT Design and Build 2016, in which the statutory approvals Relevant Event sat at cl 2.26.13 (¶36(b)). An amended cl 2.1.3 placed the risk of obtaining consents on Mace and excluded an extension under cl 2.25 for it (¶36(a)). The court refused declaration 6, on planning and consents risk, as muddled and highly fact-sensitive (¶¶38 to 41), so the case illustrates drafting; it decides nothing about where consents risk fell.

The point for prevention is the one BNP Paribas ¶192 makes: an event whose risk the contract gives to the contractor is not an act of prevention, and North Midland confirms that such an allocation is enforceable. Gateway 2 and Gateway 3 approval delay on higher-risk buildings is the obvious 2026 candidate (Opinion.) (current medians are on the hub). Check the DB 2024 number for the statutory approvals event against the executed contract.

§ 07

Where it still bites: requirements outside the machinery, and conduct

Two 2026 decisions show the principle is alive; read them for what they decided.

UK Global Healthcare Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care14 [2026] EWHC 561 (TCC) concerned contracts for the supply of gloves. Constable J dismissed DHSC's applications for summary judgment on its £15.35m counterclaim and to strike out UKGH's claim. UKGH's argument that DHSC's conduct had put time at large was not pleaded (¶31). The judge restated the principle, citing Trollope & Colls and Adyard (¶32), and held it arguable that pre-delivery testing requests which DHSC had no right to make under the original contracts prevented timely delivery and put time at large (¶87). He also found a real prospect that the parties' exchanges met the "something more" that Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd15 [2018] UKSC 24 requires before conduct can override a no-oral-modification clause (¶86).

Durkan Estates Ltd v Wallace Estates Ltd16 [2026] EWHC 2003 (TCC) arose under a Building Safety Act remediation agreement. The freeholder terminated for anticipatory breach and failed to obtain reverse summary judgment (¶¶44, 69). Constable J held it plainly arguable that both parties had proceeded on the basis that completion would follow regulator approval, not the contract date, so that an estoppel by convention would stop the freeholder relying on that date and, on the developer's case, leave time at large (¶¶41, 43).

Neither case is a finding that time was at large: both are interlocutory, and UK Global Healthcare is not a construction contract. The shared pattern: requirements imposed outside the contract's risk machinery, which no Relevant Event or compensation event covers, and conduct that sets the contractual date aside. In my assessment those are where a time-at-large plea has real prospects on an English project in 2026 (Opinion.).

§ 08

If time is at large, the employer loses its liquidated damages but not its claim

  • The date goes, and so does the liquidated damages clause. With no operable date to measure from, the liquidated damages machinery cannot run (Peak).
  • The contractor must complete within a reasonable time, a question of fact on all the circumstances.
  • The employer can still sue. It recovers general damages for failure to complete within a reasonable time, proving breach and loss in the ordinary way (Rapid Building).
  • Termination does not wipe out accrued liquidated damages. In Triple Point Technology Inc v PTT Public Co Ltd17 [2021] UKSC 29 the Supreme Court held that liquidated damages accrue up to termination; they are not lost because the work was never completed.

The double edge. Where the liquidated damages rate was also the limit of the contractor's liability for delay, setting time at large can expose the contractor to general damages with no cap, measured on the employer's actual loss. Model the downside before pleading it, and check whether the contract caps delay damages separately from the liquidated damages clause (Opinion.).

§ 09

What is not settled

The status of the principle is settled at Court of Appeal level, and the Multiplex propositions are the working test. Three related things are not. There is no reported English judgment construing the JCT 2024 extension of time provisions [NEGATIVE FINDING, searched 13 October 2026]. The default rule for concurrent delay, where prevention arguments most often collide with contractor delay, rests on first-instance authority; see concurrent delay. And the two 2026 time-at-large arguments in UK Global Healthcare and Durkan v Wallace have not been decided at trial; no later judgment in either was located as at 13 October 2026.

§ 10

Where Storia fits

Every prevention argument on this page turns on two records: what the employer actually required, and what that requirement did to the critical path at the time. Storia turns correspondence, instructions, programmes and site records into one source-linked project record, so a team can show whether a demand sat inside or outside the contract, and whether it delayed completion in fact rather than in theory.

Notes

Sources and authorities

17 cited
  1. 1
    North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd[2018] EWCA Civ 1744, Court of Appeal (Sir Terence Etherton MR, Sir Ernest Ryder SPT, Coulson LJ), 30 July 2018

    A bespoke amendment to JCT Design and Build 2005 (cl 2.25.1.3(b)) providing that Relevant Event delay concurrent with contractor-risk delay "shall not be taken into account" was valid and effective. The prevention principle is not "an overriding rule of public or legal policy" (¶30), and a term implied to stop the employer levying liquidated damages for the concurrent period would contradict the express terms (¶45). Appeal dismissed; lead judgment Coulson LJ.

    Find Case Law

  2. 2
    Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No 2)[2007] EWHC 447 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Jackson J), 6 March 2007

    ¶56 sets out three propositions: (i) legitimate employer actions may be prevention "if those actions cause delay beyond the contractual completion date"; (ii) acts of prevention do not set time at large if the contract provides for extension of time in respect of those events; (iii) an ambiguous extension of time clause is construed in the contractor's favour, a proposition to be "treated with care" (¶57). At ¶103 Jackson J had "considerable doubt that Gaymark represents the law of England"; at ¶104 he distinguished it without deciding the point finally.

    Find Case Law

  3. 3
    Holme v Guppy(1838) 3 M&W 387, Court of Exchequer

    The origin of the principle: a building owner whose own conduct delayed the builder could not recover the stipulated sum for late completion.

  4. 4
    Dodd v Churton[1897] 1 QB 562, Court of Appeal

    An employer who orders extra work that delays completion cannot hold the builder to the original date for liquidated damages where the contract makes no provision to extend for it.

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  5. 5
    Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney Foundations Ltd(1970) 1 BLR 111, Court of Appeal

    Employer delay that the extension of time clause does not cover destroys the completion date and with it the liquidated damages clause. The clause must cover the act of prevention relied on. The source of the gap that sweep-up Relevant Events are drafted to close.

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  6. 6
    Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board[1973] 1 WLR 601, House of Lords

    A party whose conduct makes it impossible or impracticable for the other to complete within the stipulated time cannot insist on that time or recover liquidated damages for missing it.

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  7. 7
    Rapid Building Group Ltd v Ealing Family Housing Association(1984) 29 BLR 5, Court of Appeal

    Failure to give possession of the site, not covered by the extension of time provisions, left the employer unable to deduct liquidated damages and confined to proving general damages for delay.

    Buscar en BAILII

  8. 8
    Adyard Abu Dhabi v SD Marine Services[2011] EWHC 848 (Comm), Commercial Court (Hamblen J), 11 April 2011

    The prevention principle requires "prevention in fact; not prevention on some notional or hypothetical basis" (¶264). An employer act must actually cause delay to completion. If the contractor's own delay means the act made no actual difference to completion, the principle is not engaged.

    Find Case Law

  9. 9
    BNP Paribas Depositary Services Ltd v Briggs & Forrester Engineering Services Ltd[2024] EWHC 2903 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (HHJ Stephen Davies), 18 November 2024

    An act of prevention may be a breach of an express or implied obligation or the exercise of an entitlement such as giving an instruction (¶192). It is not the happening of an event whose risk the contract has allocated. ¶193 adopts Adyard: the conduct must render timely performance "impossible or impracticable" and must actually prevent the contractor carrying out the works. The contractor's suspension and termination failed because the asbestos survey and structural supports it said the Employer had failed to provide (¶207) were within its own design and build risk.

    Find Case Law

  10. 10
    JCT Design and Build Contract 2024cl 2.24 (notice of delay), cl 2.25 (Fixing Completion Date; 2.25.2 decision within 8 weeks), cl 2.26 (Relevant Events), cl 4.21 (Relevant Matters)

    The Relevant Events in cl 2.26 include employer "impediment, prevention or default". The Employer must decide on an extension within 8 weeks (cl 2.25.2, down from 12 in 2016), but the form gives no deemed grant if it does not. A post-practical-completion review within 12 weeks is retained.

  11. 11
    NEC4 Engineering and Construction ContractJune 2017, with amendments in January 2019, October 2020 and January 2023: cl 60.1(18), cl 61.3, cl 61.4, cl 62.6, cl 63.5

    Cl 60.1 lists 21 compensation events; 60.1(18) is a Client breach not otherwise listed. Time relief is a change to the Completion Date through the compensation event procedure, subject to the 8-week notification bar in cl 61.3, which does not apply to events arising from the Project Manager or Supervisor giving an instruction or notification, issuing a certificate or changing an earlier decision.

  12. 12
    Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd[1999] NTSC 143, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (Australia)

    A contractor that failed to give condition-precedent notice of employer-caused delay was held to have time at large. Doubted and distinguished in England in Multiplex (No 2) at ¶¶103 to 104.

    Buscar en AustLII

  13. 13
    Mace Construct Ltd v Baltic Investment Holdings Ltd[2026] EWHC 976 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Adrian Williamson KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), 28 April 2026

    Part 8 claim on an amended JCT Design and Build 2016. The statutory approvals Relevant Event sat at cl 2.26.13 (¶36(b)), but amended cl 2.1.3 placed consents risk on Mace and excluded an extension of time under cl 2.25 for it (¶36(a)). Mace's declaration that an adjudicator could not fix a completion date earlier than the Employer's Agent had was refused (¶¶42, 52); the adjudicator "can open up, revise and review" and carries out "a prospective assessment" (¶50).

    Find Case Law

  14. 14
    UK Global Healthcare Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care[2026] EWHC 561 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Constable J), 12 March 2026

    DHSC's applications for summary judgment on its £15.35m counterclaim and to strike out UKGH's claim were dismissed. The time-at-large argument was unpleaded (¶31); the court restated the prevention principle (¶32, citing Trollope & Colls and Adyard) and held it arguable that pre-delivery testing requests outside the original contracts put time at large (¶87). A real prospect of the "something more" required by Rock Advertising (¶16) arose on waiver and estoppel (¶86).

    Find Case Law

  15. 15
    Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd[2018] UKSC 24, UK Supreme Court (Lord Sumption giving the lead judgment), 16 May 2018

    A no-oral-modification clause is effective; an estoppel against relying on it needs "something more" than the informal promise itself (¶16).

    Find Case Law

  16. 16
    Durkan Estates Ltd v Wallace Estates Ltd[2026] EWHC 2003 (TCC), Technology and Construction Court (Constable J), 30 July 2026

    On a Building Safety Act remediation agreement (Completion Date 19 September 2025), the freeholder terminated for anticipatory breach and sought reverse summary judgment; the application was dismissed (¶69). It was plainly arguable that both parties had proceeded on the basis that completion would follow BSR approval rather than the contract date, so that an estoppel by convention would stop the freeholder relying on that date and, on the developer's pleaded case, leave time at large (¶¶38, 41, 43). Not suitable for summary determination (¶44).

    Find Case Law

  17. 17
    Triple Point Technology Inc v PTT Public Co Ltd[2021] UKSC 29, UK Supreme Court (Lady Arden giving the lead judgment), 16 July 2021

    Liquidated damages for delay accrue up to termination of the contract. The Court of Appeal's view that liquidated damages fall away where the work is never completed was rejected.

    Find Case Law

General information, not legal advice. Reviewed 13 oct 2026. Spotted an error? info@storiatechnologies.com

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