Concurrent Delay and Apportionment in British Columbia
British Columbia apportions concurrent delay as a damages exercise rather than an entitlement exercise. There is no Malmaison, no dominant cause and no first-in-time in BC. The province has both precise day-by-day apportionment and a 75/25 percentage apportionment that survived appeal, and no rule choosing between the models.
At a glance
- British Columbia, Canada, common law
- Construction claims, extension of time and delay
- Case law from secondary sources only, no judgment read in original text and no paragraph pinpoints
Key facts
- 01
The frame
BC asks how to split the money, not who gets the time. Apportionment is done as part of assessing damages for breach of contract, not as an allocation of entitlement to an extension
- 02
The authority that survived appeal
Foundation Co of Canada Ltd v United Grain Growers Ltd, (1997), 91 BCAC 254, 33 CLR (2d) 159 (BCCA): percentage apportionment by the trial judge, 75% owner and engineer, 25% contractor, with the owner's and engineer's appeals against it dismissed
- 03
The precise model
Kraft Construction, 2004 BCSC 703, apportioned week-by-week at roughly 50/25/25 despite an inability to match the delays temporally, Pacific Coast Construction (1986) went day-by-day
- 04
The rough-justice model
Evergreen Building (1983), 5 CLR 70 (BCSC). The trial judge declined a day-by-day analysis and allocated two-thirds / one-third
- 05
Burden
On East Kootenay Community College, the owner proves contractor-caused delay first, the contractor then shows the project would have been delayed regardless. The holding is unverified
- 06
What BC has never done
No BC decision applies Malmaison, dominant cause or first-in-time, and none cites Multiplex, Adyard or North Midland
- 07
The largest open question
Whether a contractual allocation of concurrent-delay risk to the contractor is effective in BC has never been considered by any BC court
- 08
Currency
Neither the 2021 nor the 2025 national concurrency survey cites a single BC case. The BC line is 1983 to 2004 and is not being developed
British Columbia apportions concurrent delay, and it apportions as a damages exercise rather than an entitlement exercise. English and Scottish concurrency doctrine asks who gets the time. BC asks how to split the money. A submission built on English concurrency doctrine will not land in a BC court, because the vocabulary does not map onto the question a BC judge is actually answering.
That distinction is not a stylistic preference. It changes what you file, what you ask the court to do, and what your delay expert is retained to produce. In England the concurrency argument is a fight about the extension-of-time mechanism: which event caused what, and whether the contractor is relieved. In British Columbia the reported cases treat concurrency as an incident of assessing damages for breach of contract. The court accepts that both sides contributed, and then divides responsibility, sometimes to the day and sometimes by impression.
The BC apportionment line is real, it runs from 1983 to 2004, and it includes a percentage split that survived appeal. It is also almost invisible to current national commentary, which is the second thing an adviser needs to know: the cases exist, and the judge you appear before will probably not have seen them. The pan-Canadian doctrine sits on the Canada concurrent delay page and is not repeated here. What follows is what BC does differently.
How British Columbia decides concurrent delay
BC courts apportion. Where both the owner and the contractor have contributed to overlapping delay, the reported BC approach is to divide responsibility as part of assessing damages for breach of contract and of causation, not to run a doctrinal test that hands the whole extension to one party. The split may be precise or impressionistic. Nothing in the BC authorities requires an entitlement analysis to be completed before the money is divided.
Who gets the time?
A concurrency doctrine operating on the extension-of-time machinery. The contractor either is or is not relieved, and the argument is about which causal test applies. The corpus records no BC decision applying any of these tests Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd1 included.
How do we split the money?
An apportionment carried out while assessing damages. The court divides responsibility between the parties by percentage, by window, or by rough justice. The persuasive material is a defensible allocation, not a doctrinal test.
The practical consequence for an incoming practitioner is that the submission you would file in London, Toronto or Edinburgh is the wrong shape. You are not persuading a BC judge to adopt a rule. You are offering a split, and offering more than one route to arrive at it.
The BC apportionment line the national commentary has forgotten
Five BC decisions carry the apportionment line, and between them they produce four different techniques: precise day-by-day allocation, week-by-week allocation, rough justice, burden-shifting, and a straight percentage. The most useful of them for a claimant is Foundation Co, because it is the only BC percentage apportionment to have survived appellate scrutiny, though the apportionment itself was a first-instance exercise, as every BC percentage apportionment has been.
| Case | Citation | What it did |
|---|---|---|
| Foundation Co of Canada Ltd v United Grain Growers Ltd2 | (1997), 91 BCAC 254, 33 CLR (2d) 159 (BCCA) | Percentage apportionment by the trial judge, 75% owner and engineer, 25% contractor, left undisturbed on appeal. Citation verified |
| Kraft Construction Co v Martech Electrical Systems Ltd3 | 2004 BCSC 703, 36 CLR (3d) 163 | Week-by-week apportionment, roughly 50/25/25, reached despite an inability to match the delays temporally. Citation confirmed in two independent indexes |
| Evergreen Building Ltd v H Haebler Co Ltd4 | (1983), 5 CLR 70 (BCSC) | Rough justice. The trial judge declined a day-by-day analysis and allocated two-thirds / one-third. Citation confirmed, holding UNVERIFIED, single survey |
| Pacific Coast Construction Co Ltd v Greater Vancouver Regional Hospital District5 | (1986), 23 CLR 35 (BCSC) | Precise day-by-day apportionment. One window to the contractor, one to the owner, and one to neither party (unanticipated conditions). UNVERIFIED, single survey |
| East Kootenay Community College v Nixon & Browning6 | [1985] BCJ No 766 (BCSC), aff'd (1988), 28 CLR 189 (BCCA) | Burden-shifting, the owner proves contractor-caused delay first. The contractor then shows the project would have been delayed regardless. UNVERIFIED, single survey |
Layer: jurisdictional. Every row rests on the secondary evidence tier, no BC
judgment was read in original text for this corpus, and no paragraph pinpoints
are given. The two ✔ entries are verified as to citation only. The three
rows marked UNVERIFIED rest on a single survey as to holding.
Two traps sit inside that table. First, do not cite Kraft, 2001 BCSC 1306, for concurrency, that is an earlier and different decision in the same litigation, on third and fourth party procedure, contribution and indemnity. It is a procedural ruling, not the delay judgment. Second, Foundation Co is doing more work in the BC cluster than apportionment alone: it is also the authority that an extension of time is permissive rather than mandatory, that a contractor need not seek an extension in order to claim delay damages, and that an owner's delay counterclaim can be barred where the owner strategically withheld its own notice. That last point is developed on the BC notice and time bars page.
Precise or rough justice. BC runs both, and has no rule choosing
BC has two incompatible models on its books and no authority selecting between them. Pacific Coast Construction and Kraft apportion by window, Evergreen Building refuses to and apportions by impression. Which one a trial judge adopts appears to be a matter of judicial preference rather than principle. No BC decision reconciles them, and none states a threshold at which granular analysis becomes required.
Evergreen Building cuts both ways, and anyone commissioning a delay expert in British Columbia should read it before signing the engagement letter. It is BC authority that a trial judge may refuse a granular schedule analysis altogether and apportion impressionistically. A real risk for a claimant who has invested six figures in a windows analysis, and a real opportunity for a respondent attacking one.
The corollary from Kraft is the more encouraging one, and it is the answer to the respondent who says the claim must fail because the delays cannot be matched in time: Kraft apportioned week-by-week despite an inability to match the delays temporally. On the BC line, precision is not a precondition to apportionment. It is a way of arriving at one.
This is also where BC's methodological silence bites. NEGATIVE FINDING There is no BC judgment on delay-analysis methodology at all, not critical path, not as-planned versus as-built, not windows, not retrospective time impact analysis, and no BC judgment comments on the admissibility, weight or preferred methodology of delay-analysis expert evidence. A BC court applies the general expert-evidence framework with no BC methodological authority to apply. The consequences for expert instruction are worked through on the delay analysis methods page and on the BC prolongation and quantum page.
What British Columbia has never decided
These are searched negative findings, not gaps in the research, and for concurrency they are more useful than most of the positive law. State them flat.
| Searched finding | Consequence |
|---|---|
| NEGATIVE FINDING No BC decision applies Malmaison, a dominant cause test, or first-in-time | There is no BC doctrinal test to argue about. The only survey mapping BC concurrency case-by-case concludes that Canadian jurisprudence contains no Malmaison doctrine and no first-in-time methodology at all |
| NEGATIVE FINDING No BC citation of Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd7, Adyard Abu Dhabi v SD Marine Services8 or North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd9 | BC has never considered whether a contractual allocation of concurrent-delay risk to the contractor is effective. On the corpus's assessment this is the largest open question in BC delay law |
| NEGATIVE FINDING No BC decision cites the English and Scottish concurrency cases City Inn, Walter Lilly or De Beers | The corpus records the negative finding for these three without supplying citations for them, so none is given here |
| NEGATIVE FINDING Neither the 2021 nor the 2025 national concurrency survey cites a single BC case | Both are Ontario- and Alberta-driven. The BC line is invisible to the commentary a BC judge is most likely to be handed |
| NEGATIVE FINDING No BC judgment between 2015 and 2026 squarely a large-project extension-of-time or delay decision was located | The only BC appellate delay activity found in that window is a leave refusal on an arbitral award, not a restatement of doctrine |
Layer: jurisdictional, searched negative findings recorded against the secondary evidence tier. A negative finding here means the corpus searched and did not locate the item. It is not a statement that no such decision could exist.
The North Midland gap deserves to be pleaded as a gap rather than glossed. A concurrency-allocation clause, the drafting that makes contractor-concurrent delay non-excusable by agreement, is now common in international forms and is appearing in Canadian bespoke drafting. If your BC contract contains one, neither party can tell you what a BC court will do with it, because no BC court has ever been asked. Whether a BC court would follow the English answer, treat the clause as engaging the prevention principle, or decline to enforce it, is prediction. Say so in the submission rather than asserting an outcome, and run the prevention argument alongside it.
The tension inside BC's own authority
CONFLICT, and it has never been resolved. One comparative paper reads Perini Pacific Ltd v Greater Vancouver Sewerage & Drainage District10 BC's own leading appellate delay authority, as denying delay damages to both parties, with no apportionment, where both contributed. Meanwhile BC's first-instance line, including the apportionment in Foundation Co that the Court of Appeal left undisturbed, apportions freely. The BC Court of Appeal has never addressed the tension.
The same comparative paper records that the Quebec Court of Appeal in Ansa Construction11, 1987 CanLII 799 (QCCA), expressly rejected the no-apportionment approach. Both the Perini Pacific reading and the Ansa characterisation are UNVERIFIED and rest on that single paper. Neither is adopted here. Quebec is a civil-law jurisdiction and its position does not transfer to BC. It is recorded only because it is the source of the recorded tension.
The safest formulation for a BC submission, and the one that survives a well-prepared opponent, is this: British Columbia apportions concurrent delay, usually as a matter of damages assessment rather than entitlement, but the province's leading appellate authority, Perini Pacific, has been read as denying recovery to both parties without apportionment, and that tension has never been addressed by the BC Court of Appeal.
Where prevention sits alongside the concurrency argument
Consider prevention alongside concurrency, and plead the authority precisely. The trial judge in N.B.C. Mechanical Inc v A H Lundberg Equipment Ltd12, 1999 BCCA 775 held that "whether or not NBC could have completed its work by the deadline were it not for the delays caused by Lundberg is irrelevant", and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against that finding. But it did so on a standard of review, not as a statement of law. Esson JA treated the attribution of responsibility for delay as "an assessment of the whole of the evidence" and described the contractor's own admitted 80 per cent completion at the deadline as "only one factor to be considered".
So BC has a trial finding, affirmed on deference, that owner prevention can carry the day notwithstanding contractor delay elsewhere, and no appellate rule that concurrent contractor delay is categorically irrelevant. That is more contractor-friendly than the English position and the opposite of what a North Midland-style allocation is designed to achieve, but it is a finding on particular facts, and an owner will run the "only one factor" line straight back. Prevention should be pleaded alongside apportionment rather than as a fallback. The mechanism, and BC's unusually strong time-at-large material, are on the BC prevention page.
The Negligence Act, and why the pleading matters
NEGATIVE FINDING No BC decision was located applying the Negligence Act13, RSBC 1996, c 333, to apportion responsibility for construction delay. Apportionment of delay in BC construction cases is a contractual and damages exercise, not a statutory one. In Pacific Coast Construction, Evergreen Building, East Kootenay, Kraft and Foundation Co, the courts split responsibility as a matter of assessing damages for breach of contract and of causation, without invoking the statute.
The statute becomes relevant only where the delay claim is pleaded in tort or in concurrent liability, and BC construction delay claims very often are. Foundation Co itself ran against the consulting engineer in negligent misrepresentation as well as against the owner in contract. The pleading consequence follows: a defendant who wants statutory apportionment needs the claim characterised as tortious or concurrent, and a plaintiff who wants to avoid it pleads contract only.
Record that consequence as inference from the structure of the cases, not as a holding. No BC judgment decides it in the delay context, and the underlying question, whether a BC court will apportion for contributory fault in a pure breach-of-contract delay claim, absent the statute, remains open. The corpus logs it as an unresolved item rather than answering it.
One further trap, and it is a live one in BC pleadings: the Negligence Act is c 333. The Law and Equity Act14 the source of the relief-from-forfeiture power at s 24, is c 253. The two chapter numbers are frequently transposed. Separately, NEGATIVE FINDING no BC decision applies s 24 to a construction notice provision or time bar, that argument is open and untested.
How to run a concurrency case in British Columbia
Brief both lines. The BC apportionment cases give you the outcome a BC court has actually reached, Schindler Elevator Corporation v Walsh Construction Company of Canada15, 2021 ONSC 283, gives you the analytical framework a BC judge is most likely to be shown, because the national commentary runs on Ontario authority. Schindler is Ontario and persuasive only, but the inference the corpus draws is that a BC court asked to decide concurrency today would probably reach for it rather than for Kraft or Evergreen Building.
One last point on the contract. CCDC 2 – 202016 the form most BC private work is built on, says nothing about concurrency at GC 6.5. The general conditions allocate delay by cause: owner or consultant delay contrary to the Contract Documents at GC 6.5.1 and stop work orders at GC 6.5.2 are compensable, and neutral events at GC 6.5.3 attract time only, with the GC 6.5.3.4 carve-back returning a cause beyond the contractor's control to the compensable side where the delay in fact results from owner or consultant action. What happens when two causes overlap is not addressed, and supplementary conditions rarely address it either. That silence is why the question is a pure common-law and evidential one in BC, and why the shape of the apportionment you offer matters more than the label you put on it. The rest of the BC delay picture the clocks, the notice position and the forum, sits on the British Columbia extension-of-time hub.
Sources and authorities
- 1Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd(1999) 70 Con LR 32
The English approach under which a contractor obtains a full extension of time where an employer risk event and a contractor risk event operate concurrently.
- 2Foundation Co of Canada Ltd v United Grain Growers Ltd(1997), 91 BCAC 254 (BCCA)
Percentage apportionment of responsibility for delay by the trial judge, 75% to the owner and the engineer, 25% to the contractor, with the owner's and engineer's appeals against that allocation dismissed. The decision also holds that an extension of time is permissive rather than mandatory, that a contractor is not obliged to seek an extension in order to claim delay damages, and that an owner's own delay counterclaim was barred where it had strategically withheld its own notice.
- 3Kraft Construction Co v Martech Electrical Systems Ltd2004 BCSC 703, 36 CLR (3d) 163, [2004] BCJ No 1063
Week-by-week apportionment of delay responsibility among the parties at roughly 50% / 25% / 25%, reached despite an inability to match the delays temporally. Precision of temporal matching is therefore not a precondition to apportionment in BC.
- 4Evergreen Building Ltd v H Haebler Co Ltd(1983), 5 CLR 70 (BCSC), [1983] BCJ No 435
Rough-justice apportionment. The trial judge declined to conduct a day-by-day analysis and allocated responsibility two-thirds / one-third.
- 5Pacific Coast Construction Co Ltd v Greater Vancouver Regional Hospital District(1986), 23 CLR 35 (BCSC)
Precise day-by-day apportionment. Discrete windows of delay were allocated to the contractor and to the owner respectively, and one window, arising from unanticipated conditions, was allocated to neither party.
- 6East Kootenay Community College v Nixon & Browning[1985] BCJ No 766 (BCSC), aff'd [1988] BCJ No 313, (1988), 28 CLR 189 (BCCA)
Burden-shifting on concurrency. The owner bears the burden of proving contractor-caused delay. The contractor then shows that the project would have been delayed regardless.
- 7Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd[2007] EWHC 447 (TCC)
The English position that prevention does not set time at large where the contract provides for an extension of time in respect of the relevant events.
- 8Adyard Abu Dhabi v SD Marine Services[2011] EWHC 848 (Comm)
The English requirement of actual prevention rather than a theoretical possibility of prevention.
- 9North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd[2018] EWCA Civ 1744
The English authority upholding a contractual allocation of concurrent-delay risk to the contractor.
- 10Perini Pacific Ltd v Greater Vancouver Sewerage & Drainage District(1966), 57 DLR (2d) 307 (BCCA); SCC appeal [1967] SCR 189, 60 DLR (2d) 385, 1967 CanLII 104
The Canadian statement of the prevention principle. One comparative paper additionally reads the decision as denying delay damages to both parties, with no apportionment, where both had contributed to the delay.
- 11Ansa Construction1987 CanLII 799 (QCCA)
The Quebec Court of Appeal expressly rejected the approach of denying delay damages to both parties without apportionment where both had contributed.
- 12N.B.C. Mechanical Inc v A H Lundberg Equipment Ltd1999 BCCA 775
The owner's liquidated damages counterclaim failed because the owner's own requests for extras caused a significant part of the delay, so the contractor was prevented from completing by the stipulated date. The trial judge held that whether the contractor could have completed on time but for the owner's delays was irrelevant; the Court of Appeal declined to interfere, treating attribution of responsibility for delay as an assessment of the whole of the evidence and the contractor's own incomplete progress as "only one factor to be considered".
- 13Negligence ActRSBC 1996, c 333
The BC statutory apportionment regime for fault. No BC decision was located applying it to apportion responsibility for construction delay.
- 14Law and Equity ActRSBC 1996, c 253
Contains the relief-from-forfeiture power at s 24. It is a different statute from the Negligence Act and the two chapter numbers are frequently transposed.
- 15Schindler Elevator Corporation v Walsh Construction Company of Canada2021 ONSC 283
The leading Canadian statement on concurrency. Delays are concurrent where delays to co-critical and co-controlling activities overlap, any requirement that delays be parallel in time and identical in duration is rejected. Causation is the but-for test applied robustly and with common sense, with material contribution reserved for the exceptional case where causation cannot otherwise be proved.
- 16CCDC 2, Stipulated Price Contract, 2020CCDC 2 – 2020, GC 6.5
GC 6.5 allocates delay by cause, owner or consultant delay contrary to the Contract Documents (6.5.1, compensable), stop work orders (6.5.2, compensable) and neutral events (6.5.3, time only), and says nothing about what happens when two causes overlap. GC 6.5.3.4 carries a carve-back under which a cause beyond the contractor's control is time-only unless the delay in fact results from owner or consultant action.
General information, not legal advice. Reviewed Sep 8, 2026. Spotted an error? info@storiatechnologies.com
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